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I had been a federal district court judge for almost eleven years
when I took senior status on September 1, 2006. The next day, I inter-
viewed a third-year law student for a clerkship who, upon learning that
I was a senior judge, candidly confessed that he applied only to active
judges. I soon realized that he associated "senior" with "senile" and
did not have a clue as to the differences between active and senior
judges other than their perceived relative antiquity. (He did not get
the job.) I explained the differences to him-how and why one be-
comes a senior judge and what life as a senior judge is all about. In
doing so, I made a mental note that it might be useful to the bar, and
especially to law-clerk applicants, if I found some time to put pen to
paper and memorialize what I told that young man. To his credit, he
asked, and I answered, the following questions:
WHAT IS "SENIOR STATUS"?
A brief historical overview of the creation of the Judiciary is useful
to understanding why the position of senior judge came into exis-
tence. Article III of the Constitution provides that " [t] he judicial
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish," and further, that "[t] he Judges, both of the supreme
and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour,
and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation,
which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office."'
Article II gives the President the power to appoint federal judges "by
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate" 2 and provides that
"[t]he President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United
States," including federal judges, "shall be removed from Office on
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors." 3 The power to impeach is vested in the
t Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York. LL.B.,
Cornell University, 1959.
1 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
2 Id. art. II, § 2.
3 Id. art. II, § 4.
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House of Representatives, 4 and the power to try impeachments is
vested in the Senate.5 Thus, the Constitution provides only the broad
framework for the Judiciary. The details-including the size of the
Supreme Court, the creation and structure of lower federal courts,
and compensation for all federal judges-were left to Congress (sub-
ject, of course, to the President's veto power).
Congress wasted no time in filling in these details. The Judiciary
Act of 1789 (probably best known as the statute at issue in Marbury v.
Madison6) set the size of the Supreme Court at six 7 and divided the
country into thirteen judicial districts-two each for Massachusetts
and Virginia" and one each for Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey,
Georgia, Connecticut, Maryland, South Carolina, New Hampshire,
and New York.9 Each district contained a district court with a single
district judge. 10 To this small band ofjudges fell the responsibility of
hearing, in the first instance, a wide variety of civil and criminal
cases.'' In addition, the Act required each district judge to "ride cir-
cuit" and sit with two Supreme Court Justices on one of the country's
three circuit courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over the district
courts. 12 Furthermore, the circuit courts had original jurisdiction
over the more serious criminal and civil cases.' 3
The original district judges received an annual salary ranging
from $800 for the District of Delaware to $1,800 for the (presumably
busier) Districts of Virginia and South Carolina. 14 The Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court received $4,000 a year, while each of the five
Associate Justices received $3,500.15 The President, by comparison,
received the princely annual sum of $25,000.16
Over the years, Congress has tinkered with the structure of the
Judiciary. In 1891, for example, it created nine "new" circuit courts.17
4 See id. art. I, § 2.
5 See id. art. 1, § 3.
6 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
7 See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 73, 73.
8 Massachusetts was divided into the "Massachusetts District" and the "Maine Dis-
trict," which was then part of Massachusetts. See § 2, 1 Stat. at 73. Similarly, Virginia,
which, in 1789, included the future state of Kentucky, was divided into the "Virginia Dis-
trict" and the "Kentucky District." See id.
9 See id. At the time the Act was passed, only these eleven of the original thirteen
states had ratified the Constitution; soon thereafter, North Carolina ratified it on Novem-
ber 21, 1789, seeAct ofJune 4, 1790, ch. 17, 1 Stat. 126, and Rhode Island ratified it on May
29, 1790, see Act of June 23, 1790, ch. 21, 1 Stat. 128.
10 See § 3, 1 Stat. at 73-74.
11 See § 9, 1 Stat. at 76-77.
12 See § 4, 1 Stat. at 74-75.
13 See § 11, 1 Stat. at 78-79.
14 See Act of Sept. 23, 1789, ch. 18, § 1, 1 Stat. 72.
15 See id.
16 See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 19, § 1, 1 Stat. 72.
17 See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826, 826-27.
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The bulk of federal appellate jurisdiction was transferred to these in-
termediate appellate courts, thereby freeing the Supreme Court to
take only those cases it deemed worthy.' In addition, these "new"
circuit courts (later redesignated as simply the "courts of appeal") ren-
dered redundant the "old" circuit courts; the latter were finally abol-
ished in 1911,19 leaving the three-tiered structure of Article III courts
that we know today.20
Congress has also altered the size of the Supreme Court (settling
on the current size of nine in 1869),21 subdivided and added circuits
and districts as the country expanded, and periodically increased sala-
ries. Until relatively recently, however, Congress neglected the issue
ofjudicial retirement. In a fine speech commemorating the unveiling
of the portraits of the living senior judges of my court, the Eastern
District of New York (EDNY), my colleague Judge I. Leo Glasser
traced the development of the law in this area:
Prior to 1869, there was neither a resignation nor a retirement sys-
tem available for federal judges. Old judges, even those who were
either physically or mentally disabled, were compelled to remain in
office as a regular active judge or resign without any retirement ben-
efit whatsoever. By an Act of 1869, a judge appointed pursuant to
Article III of the Constitution could resign at age 70 after ten years
of service with a continued right to receive his salary for life thereaf-
ter. That Act, however, made no provision for continued judicial
service and deprived the federal judiciary of the service of many very
experienced and able judges who were willing to continue to work
at least part-time if they were unable to continue to do so full time.
Responding to that undesirable situation, [in 1919] Congress cre-
ated the office of Senior Judge and thus enabled the federal judici-
ary to continue to benefit from the service of many dedicated and
experienced judges. 22
18 See § 6, 26 Stat. at 827-28.
19 See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 289, 36 Stat. 1087, 1167.
20 In addition, Congress has provided for magistrate judges to assist the district
judges, see 28 U.S.C. § 631 (2000), and bankruptcy judges, see id. §§ 151, 157(a) ("Each
district court may provide that any or all cases under title 1] [i.e., the Bankruptcy Code]
and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case under
title 11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district."). Thesejudgeships are
not filled by presidential nomination and senatorial confirmation, see id. §§ 631 (a) (au-
thorizing district judges to collectively appoint magistrate judges for their respective
courts), 152 (a) (1) (authorizing circuitjudges to collectively appoint bankruptcyjudges for
districts within their respective circuits based on recommendations from the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States), and do not carry life tenure, see id. §§ 631 (e) (providing an
eight-year term for magistrate judges), 152(a) (1) (providing a fourteen-year term for bank-
ruptcy judges).
21 See Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, § 1, 16 Stat. 44.
22 Hon. I. Leo Glasser, Remarks at Portrait Unveiling, Brooklyn, N.Y. (May 22, 1996)
(on file with author).
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Currently, any Article III judge or justice may take senior status
after meeting the age and service requirements of the "Rule of
Eighty"-your age and years of service must add up to eighty, you
must be at least sixty-five years old, and you must have been on the
bench for at least ten years. 23 In my case, since I was sixty years old
when I became a district courtjudge, I satisfied all three criteria when
I turned seventy, ten years later.
Officially, one takes senior status by "retir[ing] from regular ac-
tive service." 24 The mechanism for doing so is straightforward: The
judge simply writes a letter to the President stating that on a particular
date the judge intends to retire from regular active service, having met
the requisite age and service requirements, and that the judge intends
to continue to render substantial judicial service as a senior judge.
Senior status is not to be confused with full retirement or resigna-
tion. Provided they render "substantial service" to the courts, which
may be satisfied by simply doing the same work as an active judge for
three months per year,25 senior judges continue to perform the same
judicial duties and receive the same salary as active judges.26 Moreo-
ver, like active judges, they continue to serve for life, are barred from
the practice of law, and are subject to the same restrictions on earn-
ings from outside sources.27
"Full retirement" means that having satisfied the Rule of Eighty,
the judge completely retires from the bench; he or she no longer per-
forms judicial duties and is free to pursue, without limitation, any
other employment (barring certain ethical conflicts). The retired
judge receives an annual annuity equal to the salary at the time of
retirement (with no postretirement adjustments or salary increases). 28
"Resignation" means the voluntary relinquishment of all judicial du-
ties and return to the private sector, without having met the age and
23 28 U.S.C. § 371 (c).
24 Id. § 371 (b) (1).
25 See id. § 371 (e) (1).
26 See id. §§ 294(b) (judicial duties), 371(b) (1) (salary). This equivalency, however,
is contingent upon certain statutory requirements, discussed infra text accompanying notes
46-54.
27 The Code of Conduct for United States Judges prohibits judges from practicing
law, see CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATESJUDGES, ch. 1, Canon 5F, and from "serv[ing]
as an officer, director, active partner, manager, advisor, or employee of any business other
than a business closely held and controlled by members of the judge's family." Id. at Ca-
non 5(C) (2). In addition, a judge is prohibited from receiving any honoraria and from
earning outside income more than 15% of a district judge's salary. See 2 ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES VI-15 (implementing the
Act for federal courts). Judges are, however, free to teach (subject to the approvals of the
chiefjudges of their circuits). See id. For senior judges who continue to provide "substan-
tial service," income derived from approved teaching does not count towards the 15% cap
on outside income. See id.
28 See 28 U.S.C. § 371(a).
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service requirements of the Rule of Eighty; there are no retirement
benefits, and all compensation ceases.
In contrast to the federal system, many states subject their judges
to mandatory retirement. In New York, for example, every judge is
required to retire on "the last day of December in the year in which he
or she reaches the age of seventy." 29 Postretirement, judges of the
New York Court of Appeals and justices of the New York Supreme
Court may continue to "perform the duties of a justice of the supreme
court," but "[a] retired judge or justice shall serve no longer than un-
til the last day of December in the year in which he or she reaches the
age of seventy-six." 30
Life tenure versus mandatory retirement remains a subject of
much debate. For example, this past summer, the president of the
New York State Bar Association appointed a Task Force on the
Mandatory Retirement of Judges, charged with "examin[ing] and
mak[ing] recommendations as to whether New York's policy of
mandatory retirement for judges should be retained, modified or
eliminated. '3 1 Although an analysis of the merits of each system is
beyond the scope of this Comment, the principal divide focuses on
the issue of whether the public should be protected against the aging
judge from drifting into senility on the bench. On that issue, I find
myself in league with Alexander Hamilton who in defending federal
lifetime tenure in 1788 leveled the following criticism at New York's
constitution, which, at that time, imposed mandatory retirement at
age sixty:
There is no station, in relation to which [mandatory retirement] is
less proper than to that of a judge. The deliberating and compar-
ing faculties generally preserve their strength much beyond that pe-
riod in men who survive it; and when, in addition to this
circumstance, we consider how few there are who outlive the season
of intellectual vigor, and how improbable it is that any considerable
portion of the bench, whether more or less numerous, should be in
such a situation at the same time, we shall be ready to conclude that
limitations of this sort have little to recommend them. In a repub-
lic, where fortunes are not affluent, and pensions not expedient,
the dismission of men from stations in which they have served their
29 N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 25(b).
30 Id. This effective extension of the retirement age requires a certification that "the
services of such judge orjustice are necessary to expedite the business of the court and that
he or she is mentally and physically able and competent to perform the full duties of such
office," id., which certifications must be renewed every two years. See id. The certifications
are made by the Administrative Board of the Courts, see N.Y.JUD. L. §§ 114, 115 (McKinney
2001), a body consisting of the chief judge of the Court of Appeals and the presiding
justice of each of New York's four judicial departments, see N.Y. CoNsT. art. 6, § 28(a).




country long and usefully, on which they depend for subsistence,
and from which it will be too late to resort to any other occupation
for a livelihood, ought to have some better apology to humanity
than is to be found in the imaginary danger of a superannuated
bench. 32
While the "graying of America" has weakened Hamilton's point that
nature would take care of elderly judges without the need for a
mandatory retirement age, the remainder of his argument is as true
today as it was then. Indeed, most judges are able and willing to serve
beyond their seventieth (or even seventy-sixth) birthday and New York
State is depriving its residents of valuable judicial talent. By contrast,
five of my colleagues on the EDNY are fully functioning in their eight-
ies, led by the eldest, Judge Jack Weinstein who at the age of eighty-
five after forty years on the bench, remains one of the stalwarts of the
entire Judiciary.33
WHAT ARE THE ADVANTAGES OF TAKING SENIOR STATUS?
There are three principal advantages to taking senior status: (1) it
allows the judge to continue with the judge's coveted judicial career,
the intellectual stimulation it affords, and the judge's commitment to
public service; (2) it gives the judge the opportunity to have more
control over the quantity and quality of his or her workload, without
loss of pay, provided the judge continues to perform "substantial ser-
vice"; and (3) it creates a vacancy, thereby paving the way for addi-
tional judicial help for the courts.3 4
In taking senior status, the judge has decided to forgo the signifi-
cant income that a return to the private sector would undoubtedly
offer (which would be in addition to the judge's retirement annuity)
and to continue to rely on his or her judicial salary. Congress has,
however, provided some relatively small economic incentives to entice
the judge to remain on the bench. For example, unlike a retired
judge, who receives an annuity frozen at the time of retirement, 35 the
senior judge's salary for performing "substantial service," being the
same as active judges, includes all cost of living adjustments and salary
increases.3 6 In addition, Congress has provided that the senior
32 THE FEDERALIST No. 79, at 404 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.M. Dent & Sons ed.,
1961).
33 Realistically, the public need not fear that the aging judge who is no longer able to
effectively perform his or her judicial duties will become a loose cannon. In the first place,
those who have taken senior status are subject to the rules discussed infra text accompany-
ing notes 46-54. In any event, in the rare instances in which intervention has been indi-
cated, the judges of the respective court use their collegial powers of persuasion to address
the problem.
34 See 28 U.S.C. § 371(d) (2000).
35 See id. § 371(a).
36 See id. § 371 (b) (1).
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judge's salary is not subject to deductions for FICA and Medicare
taxes. 37 While it is still subject to federal income taxation, New York
State (along with several other states) and New York City exempt se-
nior-status compensation from state and city income taxes. 38
Nonetheless, there are those who, upon becoming eligible for se-
nior status, are drawn to the economic lure of private practice. There
are also an increasing number of active judges who are also economi-
cally driven to return to private practice even though they have not
qualified for senior status, thereby relinquishing any further judicial
salary or the prospects of a retirement annuity. Regrettably, Congress
has not taken significant steps to address judges' financial sacrifices in
choosing judicial service over private practice because it has not in-
creased judicial salaries (other than small cost-of-living adjustments)
since 1991; they are currently $165,200 for district judges, $175,100
for circuit court judges, $203,000 for Associate Justices, and $212,100
for the Chief Justice. 39
In his most recent annual report on the state of the Judiciary,
Chief Justice John Roberts highlighted the problem by describing
Congress's failure to raise federal judges' salaries as "a constitutional
crisis that threatens to undermine the strength and independence of
the federal judiciary. '40 The Chief Justice noted that, adjusted for in-
flation, "the average U.S. worker's wages have risen 17.8% in real
terms since 1969," while during the same time period "[f]ederaljudi-
cial pay has declined 23.9%-creating a 41.7% gap, '41 with the result
that "many judges who must attend to their families and futures have
no realistic choice except to retire from judicial service and return to
private practice. '42
In an obvious show of respect for senior judges, the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States has determined that senior judges who
provide "substantial service" are "entitled to continued office space
37 See 26 U.S.C. § 3121 (i) (5); 42 U.S.C. § 409(h).
38 Section 111, title 4 authorizes states to tax the incomes of federal officers and em-
ployees as long as "the taxation does not discriminate against the officer or employee be-
cause of the source of the pay or compensation." In Davis v. Michigan Department of
Treasury, the Supreme Court held that the same antidiscrimination principle applies to
state taxation of the retirement benefits of federal officers and employees. See 489 U.S.
803, 817 (1989).
39 See ADMIN. OmCE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL SALARIES SINCE 1968, http://www.
uscourts.gov/salarychart.pdf. The dearth of pay raises for the Judiciary is attributable in
large part to the fact thatjudges' salaries are linked to the salaries of members of Congress.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 5, 44, 135. Thus, to give members of the Judiciary a raise, Congress must
give itself a raise, often a politically unpopular move.
40 JOHN G. ROBERTS JR., 2006 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1, http://
www.supremecotirtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2006year-endreport.pdf.
41 Id. at3.
42 Id. at 6.
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and secretarial and law clerk support. "'43 While the circuit judicial
councils are the ones who ultimately make specific staffing deci-
sions,44 in practice a senior judge is allocated the same number of law
clerks as an active judge, absent a significant reduction in workload.
The nature of the senior judge's workload is the product of the
customs and practices of the particular court and the predilections of
the particular senior judge. The general notion outside the Judiciary
is that senior status is akin to semiretirement because senior judges
are entitled to reduce their caseloads. Though most senior judges na-
tionwide do so, they nonetheless remain an invaluable asset to their
courts: As of September 30, 2006, 36% of the country's complement
of 1,018 district judges were senior judges (364), and as reflected in
the most recent statistics available, during the period fromJuly 1, 2005
to June 30, 2006, senior judges disposed of 17% of all terminated
cases and presided over 18.3% of all trials. During those same respec-
tive time frames, 37% of all circuitjudges (109 out of 292) were senior
judges, and they handled 17.1% of their courts' cases. It is at once
apparent that the federal judicial system would be enormously bur-
dened if the seniorjudges were to retire rather than continue to serve,
even though there is little economic incentive to do so.
Notably, this concept of semiretirement and the resultant nation-
wide approximate 50% reduction in the senior judges' workloads in
the district and circuit courts is not the case with my court for which,
remarkably, current statistics compiled by the Clerk of the EDNY re-
veal that senior district judges have on average higher caseloads than
the active judges: As of October 31, 2006, 42% of the EDNY's judges
were senior judges (10 out of 24) and carried 46% of the court's
caseload (4,742 out of 10,302 cases).
What is different in the EDNY is a shift in the nature of the senior
judges' work; they can decide that they no longer wish to preside over
certain types of cases. For example, many EDNY senior judges stop
43 3 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, GUIDE TOJUDICIARY POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
§ B, ch. 6, pt. 7. The Judicial Conference of the United States is composed of the "Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court[,] . . .the chiefjudge of each judicial circuit, the chiefjudge
of the Court of International Trade, and a district judge from each judicial circuit." 28
U.S.C. § 331. It acts as the principal policy-making body of the Judiciary, charged with
"mak[ing] a comprehensive survey of the condition of business in the courts of the United
States[,] . . .prepar[ing] plans for assignment of judges to or from circuits or districts
where necessary[, and] ... submit[ting] suggestions and recommendations to the various
courts to promote uniformity of management procedures and the expeditious conduct of
court business." Id.
44 Each circuit has ajudicial council "consisting of the chiefjudge of the circuit, who
shall preside, and an equal number of circuit judges and district judges of the circuit, as
such number is determined by majority vote of all such judges of the circuit in regular
active service." 28 U.S.C. § 332(a)(1). "Each judicial council shall make all necessary and
appropriate orders for the effective and expeditious administration of justice within its
circuit." Id. § 332(d)(1).
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handling pro se litigation. This does not mean that there are not wor-
thy pro se cases; indeed, the court is open to all and there are many
pro se litigants who bring important cases forjudicial resolution, espe-
cially in the metropolitan New York area where the cost of legal repre-
sentation is so high. There is, however, a surfeit of pro se cases that
are patently frivolous and take up a good amount of judicial time to
process, so senior judges cannot be faulted for deciding to forgo dis-
posing of lawsuits againstJesus, Moses, and Mohammed. But, as statis-
tics show, a shift in the type of cases that EDNY senior judges handle
does not equate to fewer cases; the senior judges remain in the same
assignment wheel as the active judges and usually wind up with more
challenging and demanding substitute cases. In addition, EDNY se-
nior judges are free to further enhance the breadth of their judicial
work by accepting out-of-district assignments, thereby increasing their
workloads well beyond that of many active judges. 45
In sum, senior judges in general, and EDNY senior judges in par-
ticular, have more control over the quantity and quality of their work-
worlds; judges are free to determine how they wish to shape this stage
of their judicial careers.
WHAT ARE THE DISADVANTAGES OF TAKING SENIOR STATUS?
There are a few statutory restrictions. On paper, one looms large:
Under 28 U.S.C. § 294(b), a senior judge cannot perform judicial du-
ties unless "designated and assigned" to do so; the chief judge of the
circuit makes designations for assignments within the senior judge's
circuit,4 6 while the ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court makes designa-
tions for assignments outside the circuit in response to a certificate of
necessity from the circuit of the "borrowing" court.4 7 Supreme Court
Justices who retire may also take senior status and are eligible for as-
signments by the Chief Justice to sit on the circuit and district
courts.
4 8
45 See 28 U.S.C. § 294(d). The chief judge of a circuit may assign district judges to
serve on the circuit court or any district court within the circuit. See id. § 292(a)-(b).
District judges may also be assigned to serve on a circuit or district court outside their
"home" circuits, but such intercircuit assignments require a certificate of need from the
chief judge of the "borrowing" circuit and the approval of the Chief Justice. See id.
§ 292(d). Under guidelines promulgated by the judicial Conference, a court that is "bor-
rowing" a judge from another circuit cannot simultaneously "lend" an active judge to an-
other circuit. See 3 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES § B, ch. 2, Ex. A-i. For example, the EDNY, with its busy docket, has been a
"borrowing" district for many years. But this so-called "lender versus borrower rule" does
not apply to seniorjudges; thus, a willing seniorjudge from a "borrowing" court may never-
theless serve wherever needed.
46 See 28 U.S.C. § 294(c).
47 See id. § 294(d).
48 See id. § 294(a).
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This "designation and assignment" requirement directly affects a
senior judge's compensation:
In order to continue receiving the salary of the office .... ajustice
must be certified in each calendar year by the Chief Justice, and a
judge must be certified by the chiefjudge of the circuit in which the
judge sits, as having met the requirements for ["substantial
service."] 49
A senior judge who is not designated and assigned to perform judicial
duties obviously cannot meet the "substantial service" requirement.
One prominent jurist (who has not taken senior status) has
viewed submission to the "designation and assignment" requirement
of § 294 in exchange for continued compensation as a relinquishment
of lifetime tenure, being "a variant of the 'buy out' schemes by which
universities and other employers try to induce retirement."50 David
Stras and Ryan Scott take that argument a step further and suggest
that this feature of senior status, among others, makes it unconstitu-
tional.51 In practice, however, the requirements of § 294 have proven
to be pro forma as long as the judge is rendering "substantial service,"
and they have had little impact on deterring judges from taking senior
status. I know of no case in which this "veto power" has been
exercised.
On a more practical level, a senior judge cannot serve as the chief
judge of his or her court. By statute, the chief judgeship of each cir-
cuit and district court is filled upon a vacancy by the judge with the
most seniority who, at the time of the vacancy, (1) is under sixty-five
years of age, and (2) has not retired or taken senior status. 52 As the
position of chiefjudge carries a seven-year term,5 however, in a good-
sized court like the EDNY, only a few of the judges would ever qualify
for chiefjudge; hence, this limitation is academic for almost all of the
judges.
The only other statutory restrictions are those contained in 28
U.S.C. § 296, which, for some inexplicable reason, precludes a senior
49 See id. § 371 (e) (1); see also supra text accompanying notes 25-26 (differentiating
senior judges from retired judges and judges who have resigned).
50 Posting of Richard Posner to Becker-Posner Blog, http://www.becker-posner-blog.
com/archives/2005/03/judicial-term_l.html (Mar. 12, 2005, 14:09 EST).
51 See David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Are SeniorJudges Unconstitutional?, 92 CORNELL L.
REv. 453 (2007).
52 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(1) (circuit judges), 136(a)(1) (district judges). The ascen-
sion to a chief judgeship is automatic and carries a seven-year term, see id. §§ 45(a) (3) (A)
(circuit judges), 136(a) (3) (A) (district judges); however, a chief judge must step down
when he or she reaches the age of seventy or takes senior status, see id. §§ 45(a) (3) (C)
(circuit judges), 136(a) (3) (C) (district judges). In addition, a chiefjudge may step down
at any time by so informing the Chief Justice. See id. §§ 45(c) (circuit judges), 136(d)
(district judges).
53 See id. §§ 45(a) (3) (A), 136(a) (3) (A).
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judge from appointing any person to a statutory position in the court
and from designating depositories for funds or newspapers for publi-
cation of notices. As a general proposition, senior judges do not be-
come involved in matters of court administration, although most
would probably consider this as another advantage rather than a limi-
tation. In the EDNY, however, which has a proud history and tradi-
tion of treating its senior judges with dignity and respect, the senior
judge participates fully in all aspects of the court's work, having an
equal voice in all board-of-judges meetings and the selection process
for the district's magistrate judges. 54
WHY DOESN'T EVERY JUDGE TAKE SENIOR STATUS
As SOON As HE OR SHE Is ELIGIBLE?
With so many advantages and so few practical disadvantages, one
would think that every judge who wished to remain on the bench
would take senior status as soon as eligible. This is not always the case.
From my observations, judges deciding whether and when to take se-
nior status-other than those who are troubled by the statutory power
of the chief judge of their circuits to preclude them from continuing
to perform their judicial duties-fall into five categories: (1) the
money-concerned judge, (2) the successor-concerned judge, (3) the
psychologically challenged judge, (4) the semiactive senior judge, and
(5) the active senior judge.
1. The Money-Concerned Judge
This judge wishes to immediately capitalize on the monetary ben-
efits bestowed on senior judges because their salaries are not subject
to federal FICA and Medicare taxes and, in some localities, to state
and city taxation. These tax savings help to a small degree to assuage
the loss of income the judge could make in the private sector and
Congress's failure to provide for any salary increases during the better
part of the last two decades. Thus, this judge's senior status letter to
the President is usually dated and mailed on the first date of eligibility.
2. The Successor-Concerned Judge
While senior judges have no formal role-nor should they-in
the selection of their successors, there are those who nonetheless de-
sire to impact the appointment of the person who will fill the resulting
54 As noted, bankruptcy judges are selected by the circuit courts based on recommen-
dations from the judicial Conference of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1). The
judicial Conference makes its recommendation based on recommendations from the Di-
rector of Administrative Office of the United States Courts, which, in turn, consults "with
the judicial council of the circuit involved." Id. § 152(b) (1). Despite this circuitous pro-
cess, in practice, the recommendations of the relevant judicial council are usually heeded.
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vacancy. Strong political or other convictions often influence these
successor-concerned judges, who may consequently defer taking se-
nior status. To understand this, one should have a sense of how the
appointment process realistically works.
Although the President nominates and the Senate confirms all
Article III judges,55 the process usually begins at the local political
level. The generally understood practice is that the U.S. senators
from the same political party as the President agree amongst them-
selves to recommend a candidate to the President whenever a vacancy
occurs in their state. 56 When the senators are from different political
parties, they usually agree amongst themselves on how to divide the
recommendations.
If, however, there is no senator from the President's political
party, the White House will either turn to other state political sources
from the President's party, such as a governor or congressional leader,
or directly solicit potential candidates from other sources. At the time
when I qualified for senior status, there was a Republican President,
two Democrat New York senators, and a Republican governor. The
White House looked to the Republican governor for recommenda-
tions. However, the White House, the senators, and the governor
reached a collaborative understanding that, in keeping with the bipar-
tisan tradition that Senators Pat Moynihan and Al D'Amato estab-
lished, there would be a 3-1 division, with the governor having the
dominant number of recommendations. This did not mean that the
White House would necessarily accept the recommendations, but
most times that was the case. 57
The last vacancy filled on my court prior to my qualifying for se-
nior status came from a recommendation by Senator Chuck Schumer.
Not surprisingly, the appointee was a Democrat; therefore, I surmised
that the recommendation to the President to fill my vacancy would
likely come from the governor and would probably be a Republican.
This reality required me to decide whether I would defer taking se-
nior status until it was more likely that my successor would be of my
political persuasion, which would require waiting until one of the
Democratic Senators had a pick or a Democrat might be elected Presi-
dent three years hence. The answer for me was easy: I and, from my
observations throughout the years, all of my colleagues in the EDNY
have taken pride in discharging our judicial responsibilities without
political partisanship and, regarding vacancies, have been of the sin-
55 See U.S. CONST. art. If, § 2.
56 See David S. Law, Appointing Federal Judges: The President, the Senate, and the Prisoner's
Dilemma, 26 CARDozo L. REv. 479, 487-88 (2005).
57 With New York's election this year of a Democratic governor, the process the White
House will use to select nominees for future vacancies in the state is uncertain.
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gular mind that they should simply be filled by highly qualified and
respected lawyers who would grace the bench. My decision to take
senior status would not therefore be driven by my personal political
beliefs but rather by the hope that my successor would meet that stan-
dard of excellence.
My hope for such a successor was soon realized when the gover-
nor's office told me that the governor had two candidates whom he
would recommend to the White House to fill my vacancy should I take
senior status: One was a former law clerk of mine and one of the very
best; the other was also known by me to be extraordinarily well-quali-
fied. I had no trouble "making way" for either candidate, and I imme-
diately submitted my letter to the President taking senior status. The
Governor quickly sent both candidates to Washington, D.C. to be in-
terviewed by the White House Counsel's Office, and one of them,
Brian Cogan, now Judge Cogan, soon became my successor. 58
3. The Psychologically Challenged Judge
There are those who simply have a difficult time accepting the
label "senior" as compared to "active," even in those districts such as
the EDNY where there are only substantive positives to taking senior
status. These judges somehow feel that they will become lesserjudges.
Once they recognize that this is not so and that the dates on their
birth certificates will be the same, be they "active" or "senior," they
usually see the virtue in the new opportunities, especially in districts
like the EDNY, that comes with senior status, as well as the value to the
courts in creating vacancies, and overcome this psychological hurdle.
4. The Semiactive Senior Judge
As shown by the statistics, the nationwide average reflects that
most senior judges reduce their caseloads by about 50%, although
they continue to dispose of a significant amount of the Judiciary's
work; if not for their contributions, the Judiciary would be seriously
understaffed. Senior judges have earned the right to work less hard
and cannot be faulted for balancing their judicial responsibilities and
the opportunity to spend more time with their families and their avo-
cations in their senior years.
5. The Active Senior Judge
Not every senior judge decides to cut back on his or her wor-
kload; there are many who continue full-steam ahead: I refer to them
58 Political considerations in the selection process for district judges are generally less
profound than they are in the selection of circuit judges, who, by virtue of the right of
appeal conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1291, will have the final word in most cases, subject only to
discretionary certiorari review by the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254.
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as "active" senior judges. As statistics show, EDNYs senior judges
clearly as a group fall into this category, currently maintaining on av-
erage a larger caseload than the court's active judges. They obviously
find the work of the court more fulfilling than retirement, and many
of them avail themselves of the opportunity that senior status affords
to increase their involvement in diverse legal interests. I see myself as
falling into the category of the active seniorjudge. For example, I will
undoubtedly do some more writing and teaching on legal issues that
interest me outside of my case-specific responsibilities. Last year, I sat
by designation as a visiting judge on the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in San Francisco. 59 My courtroom deputy clerk has sug-
gested that I should even try to arrange to sit on each of the thirteen
circuit courts, something akin to climbing all the forty-six peaks of the
Adirondacks. These are all broadening experiences, good for the ag-
ing mind, body, and soul; they are also great for the judges' law clerks.
(I took two of mine to San Francisco).
WHAT THEN SHOULD THE LAW-CLERK ASPIRANT Do?
It should be perfectly apparent by now that those bright, graduat-
ing law school students who would like to have the extraordinary ex-
perience of a federal circuit or district court clerkship should not rule
out the opportunity to clerk for an active senior judge. To the con-
trary, it may be the very best of clerkships, given the judge's wealth of
experience and knowledge. Who, for example, would not want to
clerk for Judge Weinstein? To be sure, given the degree of difficulty
in being chosen for a clerkship of any stripe, there are still many fine
applicants for any senior judge to choose from. Nonetheless, as exem-
plified by that young man who motivated me to write this Comment,
there may still be a goodly number of clerkship applicants who do not
want to run the risk of taking a less-rewarding clerkship for a semiac-
tive senior judge (although this may not necessarily be the case) and
believe that only applying to judges who have not yet taken senior
status is the better course.
Not to miss the special opportunities that clerking for an active
senior judge may present, I suggest that the clerk applicant do some
judge-specific due diligence. In addition to inquiring from the law
school's career placement office about the judge's general reputation,
the aspiring law clerk can obtain the monthly district court judges'
59 Of the three judges comprising a circuit court panel, one may be districtjudge. See
28 U.S.C. § 46 ("[Absent extraordinary circumstances,] at least a majority of [each three-
judge panel] shall be judges of that court."). As noted, designation of districtjudges to the
circuit court is made in the case of intracircuit assignments by the chiefjudge of the circuit
and in the case of intercircuit assignments by the chief judge of the "borrowing" circuit
with the approval of the Chief Justice.
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caseload statistics, both civil and criminal, from the Clerk of the
judge's court and may possibly obtain such statistics from the clerk's
office of the other district courts. 6° As for senior circuit court judges,
the putative law clerk should inquire from the circuit executive's of-
fice as to the extent that the senior judges have cut back on their
sittings. Moreover, each senior judge's recent reported decisions of
note would also be a good barometer of the dimension and quality of
his or her senior work. And, of course, having read this Comment,
the aspiring law clerk will now understand the differences between an
active judge, a senior judge, and an active senior judge.
60 In preparing this Comment, I discovered that the availability of statistics varies
widely from court to court; nevertheless, most courts should be able to provide the
caseloads of individual judges.
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